Intrinsic Hurdles in Applying Automated Diagnosis and Recovery to Spacecraft

James Kurien and María D. R-Moreno

Abstract—Experience developing and deploying model-based diagnosis and recovery and other model-based technologies on a variety of testbeds and flight experiments led us to explore why our expectations about the impact of Model-Based Diagnosis (MBD) on spacecraft operations have not been matched by effective benefits in the field. By MBD we mean the problem of observing a mechanical, software or other system and determining what failures its internal components have suffered, using a generic inference algorithm and a model of the system’s components and interconnections. These techniques are very attractive, suggesting a vision of machines that repair themselves, reduced costs for all kinds of endeavors, spacecraft that continue their missions even when failing, and so on. This promise inspired a broad range of activities, including our involvement over several years in flying the Livingstone and 1.2 onboard model-based diagnosis and recovery systems as experiments on DS-1 and EO-1 spacecraft. Yet in the end, no spacecraft project adopted the technology in operations nor flew additional flight experiments. To our knowledge, no spacecraft project has adopted any other MBD technology in operations.

In this paper we present a cost/benefit analysis for MBD, using expectations and experiences with Livingstone as an example. We provide an overview of common techniques for making spacecraft robust, citing fault protection schemes from recent missions. We lay out the cost, benefit and risk advantages associated with on-board MBD, and use the examples to probe each expected advantage in turn. We suggest a method for evaluating a mission that has already been flown and providing a rough estimate of the maximum value that a perfect on-board diagnosis and recovery system would have provided. By unpacking the events that must occur in order to provide value, we also identify the factors needed to compute the expected value that would be provided by a real diagnosis and recovery system. We then discuss the expected value we would estimate such a system would have had for the Mars Exploration Rover mission. This has allowed us to identify the specific assumptions that made our expectations for MBD in this domain incorrect.

Index Terms—Model-Based Diagnosis, Fault Protection, spacecraft, cost, benefits, expected value.

I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past 20 years, there has been much work in the area of Model-Based Diagnosis (MBD). By this, we mean diagnosis systems arising from Computer Science or Artificial Intelligence approaches where a generic software engine is combined with model of a system’s components and interconnections to generate diagnoses and more recently to infer system recoveries or reconfigurations. Two diagnosis and recovery systems spawned by this line of research were exercised in simulations, on hardware testbeds and during two flight experiments on the Deep Space 1 (DS-1) and Earth Observer 1 (EO-1) spacecraft. A great deal of experience was gained developing these systems and applying them to a variety of diagnosis domains involving spacecraft, chemical processors, life support systems and scientific instruments. Supporting infrastructure including modeling languages, graphical model editors and validation tools was created in addition to the core inference algorithms and software that performed diagnosis and recovery. In the end however, no spacecraft project adopted the technology in operations nor flew additional flight experiments. To our knowledge, no spacecraft project has adopted any other MBD technology in operations. In short, in the ten years since the first flight experiment, the benefits we anticipated have not yet come to fruition.

This led to a series of questions. What are the costs of using MBD, what benefits are observed in practice and how can we approach the question of whether the benefits outweigh the costs for spacecraft? How are missions today approaching fault diagnosis and recovery during operations? How does the proposed MBD approach differ with the current practice, and why aren’t we able to leverage MBD technologies to provide greater value or lower cost? Is there something about planning software, in many ways a similar model-based technology, that has made it more successful, and what does that tell us? By attempting to answer these questions, we have identified specific assumptions that made our expectations for MBD in this domain incorrect.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a brief description of the spacecraft fault protection problem and common practice for addressing it, followed by a brief overview of the Livingstone model-based diagnosis and recovery system. We then consider Livingstone’s impact on spacecraft fault protection practice, both in terms of the impact we expected based on its capabilities and the impact we have observed in the subsequent years. To understand the discrepancy, we express the technology’s potential impact as a product of expected value, cost and risk rather than simply capabilities. For each of these, we identify characteristics of MBD that hinder its adoption in the spacecraft domain using the Livingstone flight experience and hypothetical application of MBD to a more recent mission as examples. In the latter case, we propose an estimate for the ideal maximum value that MBD could provide for a mission, as well as a method for reasoning about the expected value of the technology.

Finally, in Related Work, we discuss a small set of systems...
that are model-based, or pertain to diagnosis and recovery, or have been fielded in operational use, our ultimate interest being a system that is all three. In the Discussion we revisit the question of potential impact by summarizing our own experience with the cost, risk and value tradeoff for MBD, as well as our understanding of why in the spacecraft domain it has not enjoyed the same success as other model-based technologies.

II. TRADITIONAL FAULT PROTECTION PROCESS

Before discussing MBD we briefly discuss spacecraft Fault Protection (FP) for the purpose of comparison. The primary purpose of FP is to ensure that anomalies or operational problems encountered during operation of the spacecraft do not result in permanent reduction in the spacecraft’s capabilities or loss of the mission itself. As Neilson explains in an excellent overview of the FP system for the Mars Exploration Rovers (MER), FP is an engineering process that incorporates robustness to faults into spacecraft hardware, software, systems engineering and operations [1]. All of these systems are engineered to work together to reduce the likelihood that any reasonably plausible contingency will result in permanent loss of mission capabilities. This paper is largely concerned with on-board software for active fault detection, isolation and recovery. We note though that the on-board system is just one aspect of the overall FP engineering process, and in addition the on-board system for protecting the spacecraft is typically a mix of hardware and software. Traditionally, the FP engineering process is driven by fault modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA). This process typically determines the possible faults of a system or subsystem, some notion of their likelihoods, and an analysis of the impact of each. If the likelihood of a fault is deemed sufficiently high and the impact sufficiently negative, the analysis would also include how the fault would be detected and what the appropriate response would be.

The appropriate response to a fault may depend upon the phase of the mission. We use the term critical phase of a mission to mean periods of a mission where the spacecraft must take specific actions (a critical sequence) or loss or serious degradation of the mission will result. For example during the entry, descent and landing sequence each MER rover entered the Martian atmosphere at over 10,000 miles per hour. At specific times or altitudes it jettisoned a protective shell, deployed airbags, and the like. Failure to execute a step in this six minute sequence would end the mission. We say the system must fail operational in that any failure that occurs must be taken into account by the FP approach, for example by switching between redundant subsystems, to allow execution to continue. Accordingly, during development of the spacecraft an enormous amount of attention is given to the precise critical sequence the spacecraft will execute, which failures are likely, how they will be detected, and how they will be immediately mitigated. Since response must be timely, it must be available on-board. This may involve something as simple as a table mapping observed sensor values to commands that should be issued in response, for example to switch to a redundant backup. For very complex critical sequences on large spacecraft, a much more elaborate method of determining responses may be developed, such as for the Cassini orbital insertion at Saturn [2].

In a non-critical phase, it is still possible to damage or lose the mission due to a fault, but there isn’t the added constraint of having to execute a critical sequence. Thus typical FP systems tend to focus on mitigating or postponing the impact of the fault by changing the spacecraft’s state or behavior. Figure 1 illustrates a simplified FP process. In the first step, engineers use FMECA analysis to identify situations dangerous to the spacecraft (e.g. low voltage on the power bus), how they would be detected, and how the spacecraft hardware, software, ground system and operators should respond. The hardware and software portions of this policy are implemented on the spacecraft. In step two, when a fault occurs, on-board software or in some cases hardware is triggered by on-board sensors and invokes the proscribed response. In step three, if the policy maps the sensor readings to a serious problem, the spacecraft is often placed into a safe mode where the only actions taken are those that maintain the spacecraft in a quiescent state until communication can be established in step four. For example on the MER rovers, draining the battery risks not being able to heat the rover during the cold Martian night and not being able to communicate with Earth when expected. The system level MER FP includes a hardware battery controller that disconnects the batteries should a serious hardware or software failure begin to drain them. In this case, the system’s heaters, solar panels, and flight software work together to ensure the rover does nothing but stay warm and wake once during the day to contact Earth using very few hardware and software subsystems and minimal power. If the situation appears to be less grievous or more localized, then a less drastic response may be taken at first. On the MER rovers, subsystem behaviors incorporate subsystem level FP [3]. If the rover’s arm draws more than the allowed current during use, it is marked failed. The arm behavior ignores any subsequent requests to use the arm, and the rover driving behavior is disabled if the arm is not stowed away. Routine communication with Earth and other tasks that do not involve the arm continue as normal. In step five, during the next possibility for communication (hours to days depending on the mission) sensor values from the spacecraft are downloaded so ground operators can inspect the telemetry and debug the arm. In many cases, engineers may send commands to carefully gain more information about the spacecraft’s condition, or may attempt to reproduce the issue on an Earth-bound copy of the spacecraft. In step six, when the anomaly is understood, engineers may simply re-enable the spacecraft, upload a software patch to deal with the issue, or change operational procedures to allow the mission to work around it. A process similar to this has protected the MER rovers for over four years. A great summary of the anomalies and faults encountered by the rovers in the first 780 sols (Martian days) of operation is available [4].

The approach of safeguarding the entire spacecraft or select subsystems when faults are suspected has the advantage that one need not know exactly which fault is causing the operational problem. If the rover arm exceeds an operational current limit,
use of the arm ceases, which applies for a limitless number of reasons the arm might be malfunctioning from a motor short to a rock stuck in an actuator. Similarly, if the battery is being dangerously drained, the flight software may shut down its activities, but at some point if the situation persists the hardware will effectively turn off the rover and restart it in a fresh, quiescent state when solar power is available.

The above FP approach is to carefully engineer the robust but minimal fail operational capabilities needed for critical periods, and otherwise engineer hardware, software and operations so the spacecraft can be put in a safe state in response to plausible anomalies. This characterizes a wide range of FP systems that have been flown. The remainder of this paper is about experience gained attempting to improve upon this approach using MBD technology. The intent was to provide greater spacecraft autonomy and robustness, greater science return from missions, reduced operations costs, reduced analysis cost for a mission, and reduced flight software development cost. The next section describes Livingstone and L2, two model based diagnosis systems that have been flown as experiments on-board NASA spacecraft as well as demonstrated on a number of testbeds. The following section describes how Livingstone was expected to provide the benefits described above. Later, we describe why we believe these benefits were not realized, and provide some analysis of where we believe the problem lies.

III. THE LIVINGSTONE SYSTEM

Livingstone [5], [6] is a MBD system in the style of GDE [7] and Sherlock [8]. By diagnosis, we mean the problem of observing a mechanical, software or other system and determining what failures, if any, its internal components have suffered. By MBD, we mean diagnostic systems arising from Computer Science or AI approaches where a generic software inference engine is developed in the hope of addressing a large class of diagnosis problems [9], [8]. Later, system models that adapt the generic engine to a specific diagnosis domain are created. Typically a model first describes the kinds of components that comprise the mechanical system and their individual behavior. For example, a valve may be open and allow fluid flow or closed and not allow fluid flow. Livingstone also includes a model of how each component can be commanded between states. When in the open state, a valve can be commanded to the closed state. However if a valve is in the stuck closed state, commanding it has no effect. Once the components are described, the model must specify how they are interconnected. For example, consider the Cassini main propulsion system in Figure 2, which was used as a benchmark in the Livingstone papers. To avoid a persistent confusion, we note Livingstone was run against a simulation of Cassini for demonstration purposes and not as a part of the Cassini mission. The system is operated by opening valves to allow pressure from the helium tank to pressurize the oxidizer tank and fuel tank. If additional valves are opened this pushes fuel and oxidizer to exactly one of the engines, where it is ignited to create thrust. Owing to Cassini’s decade long mission, the system has many redundant paths between the various tanks and a backup engine. Valves in parallel allow a second path in case a valve sticks shut. Valves in series allow a path to be turned off if a valve sticks open.

When run against a simulation of this propulsion system, Livingstone’s task was to use its model to monitor the commands given to the valves and infer if sensor readings (e.g. pressure at various points in the system) were consistent with the expected state of the valves. If not, Livingstone would infer the most likely set of failures (e.g. valves stuck open or closed) that explained the readings. One of the main innovations of Livingstone is its ability to use the same model and inference algorithm used for diagnosis to also infer what set of commands would cause the system to move to a state with a desired property. After a failure, Livingstone is able to determine the smallest number of valves to open or close to ensure oxidizer and fuel could reach one of the engines. Thus Livingstone could automatically manage the configuration of the propulsion system so that it always produced thrust when desired even in the face of multiple failures occurring over time.

Figure 3 illustrates Livingstone’s operation at an idealized, schematic level. The generic Livingstone engine is given the high level model of the components of the spacecraft and their operation. During operation, Livingstone is fed the stream of commands that are being given to the spacecraft and the readings from sensors embedded in the spacecraft hardware (e.g. switch status bits, temperature sensors, pressure transducers, etc.). Livingstone uses the model of the spacecraft’s components and the command stream to predict the values of the sensors that should result from the commands assuming no components are failed. If there is a discrepancy between the predicted and observed sensors, then a failure is assumed. Livingstone uses the model of the components to simulate different combinations of failures. It uses a diagnosis algorithm
to quickly focus on the most likely combination of failures that would predict the sensor values that are being observed. This combination of component failures is the diagnosis. To recover from a failure, Livingstone hypothesizes that a desired property is observed (e.g., engine is receiving fuel). It uses the same predictive model and search algorithm to quickly infer commands (e.g., open sets of valves to route around a blockage) that would “predict” the desired property and thus mitigate the failure. Thus it is capable of detecting, identifying and also recovering from off-nominal conditions. With a model that includes commands, it can monitor execution of commands, detect anomalies, diagnose failures and provide recovery actions for complex systems such as a spacecraft.

IV. Expected Benefits

The promise of a system like Livingstone flows from the concept that in flight, it would use a model to infer the system-wide behavior given any combination of nominal and failed components and any sequence of commands. We envisioned a wide range of benefits if instead of manually reasoning through system wide interactions under a fixed set of fault scenarios we could simply describe the local behavior of components and allow an MBD system to infer the rest. Figure 4 conveys where we expected the MBD process to deliver these benefits versus FP. In the first step, rather than pre-designing responses for a fixed set of system-level failures we describe the nominal and (perhaps multiple) failure behaviors of each type of component and how the components are interconnected. The user models that a valve can be open and allow fluid flow, or closed and stop fluid flow, or stuck open or stuck closed, and can arrange valve combinations far more complex than the Cassini model shown. Step two represents routine operation of the spacecraft with commands and sensor values monitored by Livingstone. In step three Livingstone would detect deviations from expected sensor values. In step four rather than waiting for intervention from the ground, Livingstone would immediately infer the state of the system even in the face of multiple valves sticking closed or open. In step five, Livingstone would immediately perform the system-wide reasoning needed to start and stop fuel flow to the engines (or achieve any other state described by the model) from whatever state it had inferred for the system. Thus the spacecraft would continue performing useful activities by finding alternative ways to perform them. We next describe some of the expected benefits in slightly more detail.

- **Reduced FP implementation costs**
  Rather than develop a custom FP and safing system, the spacecraft would employ a re-usable diagnosis engine that inferred the spacecraft’s state and recovery responses on the fly from component models.

- **Significantly lower analysis costs for critical phases**
  The fail-operational response needed during a critical phase would be inferred from the model on-line during execution of the critical phase. Thus, we would reduce the manual analysis usually needed to determine how subsystems would interact during an anomaly and engineer a proper fail-operational response that could be statically encoded.

- **Greater robustness than traditional FP**
  The on-board diagnoser would infer diagnoses of double and triple failures and suggest workarounds, where a traditional FP might include pre-computed responses for single failures or certain critical anomalies involving multiple failures.

- **Greater mission return**
  By inferring fail-operational responses for any state of the spacecraft, rather than manually engineering them for specific critical sequences, we could fail operational even in non-critical periods. During a fault, the MBD system would diagnose which component was failed. It would return to an operational state by reconfiguring redundant systems, resetting components, or canceling only activities involving failed components. Operations would resume with no need to wait for intervention from the ground, increasing productivity of the spacecraft.

- **Reduced mission staffing levels and operational costs**
  Since the MBD system would resolve many anomalies without intervention from the ground, fewer expert engineers would be needed during spacecraft operations.

V. Flight Experience

A large number of talented people developed Livingstone and L2 applications for a wide variety of systems, which allowed us to gain the experience upon which this paper is based. Table I lists MBD applications developed for simulators, testbeds and two flight experiments, along with the year, and the number of different failures modeled. Where available, the number of person months spent developing the Livingstone model and person months developing the entire application (models, signal conditioning code, integration, etc.) is shown. Note that for the flight experiments, these numbers represent the additional cost of deploying Livingstone for a subset of the spacecraft systems. As discussed in subsequent sections, our observation is Livingstone performs a task somewhat orthogonal to FP, and these costs were not offset by any reduction in development of a FP system.

Livingstone was chosen in 1996 to be a part of the Remote Agent spacecraft autonomy architecture [10]. In May 1999 it was flown on the DSN-1 spacecraft as a technology experiment [11]. The first author gained direct experience with MBD
technology by doing Livingstone development, modeling of the DS-1 spacecraft, and participating in mission operations during the experiment. Livingstone and the other components of the Remote Agent software were uploaded to DS-1’s on-board computer via the Deep Space Network of radio antennas. The software executed on the DS-1 flight computer for a 20 hour test and a 6 hour test. During these tests, the Remote Agent software ran on top of the existing DS-1 flight software, which included a FP system. The flight software fed live readings from the spacecraft’s sensors to Livingstone to drive diagnosis. In addition, to ensure Livingstone would be exercised even if no failures occurred, Livingstone was fed simulated sensor readings consistent with a set of four pre-determined failure scenarios that had been modeled. These were failure of a switch position sensor, camera power switch stuck on, science instrument not responding and thruster stuck closed. In the first case, Livingstone correctly ignored the sensor, and in the remaining cases recommended recoveries of re-trying the command, power-cycling the instrument, and switching thruster control modes, respectively.

Subsequently, we developed the follow-on L2 system, with several technical improvements [6]. With L2 and the associated modeling tools, our experience applying model-based diagnosis and recovery systems to spacecraft greatly expanded. L2 was flown as a technology experiment on the EO-1 spacecraft, again operating on top of the existing FP system. L2 was activated on EO-1 for a total of 143 days in 2004 and 2005 and diagnosed 13 simulated failures [12]. Flight experiments for the X-34 and X-37 spacecraft also were developed, though those vehicles were never flown [13]. In addition to these flight experiments, Livingstone or L2 was applied to a Mars in-situ propellant production testbed (ISRU) at Kennedy Space Center [14], a testbed for the Space Interferometry Mission at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the Bio-Plex Mars habitat tested at Johnson Space Center, a testbed for the PSA micro spacecraft [15], and a rover testbed [16]. These applications tended to start with a set of known diagnostic scenarios and focus upon the relative ease or difficulty of causing the particular diagnosis formalism of Livingstone to diagnose them. While this is an interesting topic it’s beyond the scope of this paper. The Hyde system [17] is one of several systems that use a hybrid automata model, and which describes the specific areas of expressivity it seeks to improve over Livingstone.

VI. ANALYSIS OF IMPACT

A great deal was learned from the efforts of the many talented teams that used Livingstone. In retrospect though, it’s fair to say that MBD did not transform, or even impact how FP is done on NASA missions. To our knowledge, no NASA spacecraft has used Livingstone or any system like it as a part of its FP system, and as of this writing there have been no additional flights beyond the research-funded DS-1 and EO-1 experiments. This begs the question of why we did not observe the wide range of benefits we expected from applying model-based diagnosis and recovery to spacecraft operations, and why there was no ‘mission pull’ and adoption of the technology.

It is tempting to explain the lack of penetration by imagining missions are averse to incorporating new technologies. Certainly revolutionary approaches are taken all the time. Consider...
Perhaps there is some hesitance to use unfamiliar or model-based software. Consider the case of planning and scheduling technology. Coincidentally, Livingstone flew with the HSTS planner during the Remote Agent experiment, and L2 flew with the CASPER planner on EO-1. At a high level, planners are similar to Livingstone in that they comprise a generic inference engine and a model used to adapt it to a problem. A planner chooses actions to take to achieve a goal, rather than failures to explain a symptom, but the algorithms and models are similar in the grand scheme of things. As described in Related Work, HSTS evolved into ground-based tools that have generated thousands of plans for the MER rovers and are scheduled for follow on missions. CASPER became an operational tool on EO-1, continuing to run on-board for years, plan over 100,000 goals to date, and save millions of dollars in operating costs [18]. Thus missions are willing to adopt new, model-based software technologies.

As technology developers, there is a natural tendency to focus on the capabilities of a technology, such as MBD’s ability to find diagnoses and make recoveries. The decision by a mission to adopt a technology is a combination of the expected value, cost and risk given the characteristics of that particular mission. The three are intertwined. A mission may make a significant investment to buy down risk, as illustrated by the inclusion of a backup engine on Cassini. Conversely a useful mission feature that provides value may be abandoned if the cost cannot be kept under control. In these terms, we believe it’s relatively easy to understand the lack of penetration of model-based diagnosis and recovery. We provide an overview before a detailed analysis.

Consider the non-critical phases of a mission and the proposal to add fail operational capability. Figure 5 illustrates some of the complications standing in the way of realizing the benefits as we imagined them. First, rather than eliminating analysis costs in step one, our experience was that a diagnostic model requires the same type of FMECA analysis as writing a traditional FP system, and in greater quantity. The additional analysis effort comes from the fact that engineers are forced to work out recovery strategies in detail beforehand, and once derived all of this fault propagation, failure detection and recovery analysis must be encoded in a single consistent model. We next note that spacecraft typically go into safe mode relatively rarely, intrinsically limiting our cost/benefit equation. In steps three and four, we note the value of a diagnosis and recovery capability captured by our models is only realized if a failure is correctly diagnosed and a recovery more productive than safing is achieved. Surveying real mission anomalies reveals that few are failures that a priori we would have modeled and been able to recover.

Part of this is due to the enormous space of possible failures versus the limited budget and expressivity we have for developing a model. In addition, the strength of MBD lies in its use of the system design to infer diagnoses and recoveries. However, spacecraft typically are heavily analyzed and tested to ensure they perform robustly within the design parameters. When a failure occurs it often arises from interactions between subsystems or the environment that were not explicitly captured in the design assumptions. In steps five and six of the FP process, we note that when failures do occur, operators typically need to carefully understand what has occurred and what assumptions about the spacecraft design have failed. They then upload commands to address the immediate situation and often make a change to operational rules for the spacecraft before proceeding. Thus we will argue the expected value provided by MBD during non-critical phases is not high, especially when considered relative to the cost and risk involved.

Consider the critical phases of a mission and the proposal to use MBD and recovery to provide the required fail operational capability. Typically a critical phase is minutes to hours long, involves a known sequence of events, and is critical in the fate of a mission costing hundreds of millions of dollars. Added value and reduced cost from employing MBD have not been clearly demonstrated, but they would have to be incredibly high to offset the risk of not being able to verify in advance exactly how the spacecraft was going to respond to plausible scenarios during this short portion of the mission when an incorrect response will result in mission loss. Thus we will argue the risk of MBD during critical phases is high, and the value is unclear. The expected net value of using MBD over the life of a mission depends upon the expected value that the
technology provides, minus the additional risks of using it and the cost of deploying it. In the next sections, we discuss the pressures on expected value, cost and risk we believe hamper the use of on-board MBD and recovery systems. We support our analysis using the MER and DS-1 missions as examples.

VII. LOW EXPECTED VALUE

During Livingstone development we focused upon the promise that Livingstone could provide value to a mission, for example by potentially reducing the need for the spacecraft to enter a safe state. There was no attempt to quantify the magnitude of that value, leading us to overestimate it. In retrospect, in order for a MBD system to be exercised and provide value, a failure must occur, the MBD system must correctly diagnose the failure and it must suggest a useful response. It is the likelihood of these events that will determine usefulness of MBD. As with an insurance policy, the value actually provided by an MBD system during a mission isn’t known until after events have unfolded and the mission is complete. Unfortunately, we know of only two cases where an MBD system has been flown, which we discuss below. We then discuss methods for estimating the expected value if MBD were hypothetically deployed on a mission, and why we estimate it to be in general quite low.

During the two day Livingstone flight experiment and the 143 day t.2 flight experiment, none of the modeled failures of the spacecraft occurred. Two unmodeled failures in experiment-related software did occur and interfered with the flight experiment of Livingstone on DS-1. One failure we had not even considered modeling, and the other was explicitly declared out of scope during the modeling effort. Thus the only two actual failures known to have occurred during a Livingstone flight experiment were not identified or recovered from [11]. The t.2 flight experiment also generated 14 false positives, diagnosing modeled failures when none occurred. Thus in these two very short experiments, this particular MBD system provided no operational value.

These two data points involving a particular MBD technology are too few to draw any conclusions about the actual value provided by MBD for spacecraft applications. However, like an actuary, we can compute the expected value MBD would provide to other missions from the product of the likelihood of the events leading to MBD operating correctly and the value of it doing so. To estimate the expected value for a mission, we then need to estimate the following quantities:
- the likelihood of a failure actually occurring (≤ 1)
- the likelihood of correctly diagnosing the failure that actually occurs (≤ 1)
- the likelihood of providing proper response (≤ 1)
- the value of generating the correct diagnosis and response on-board (timeliness, reduced operations cost)

To provide a concrete example of how we would reason through this analysis for a mission, Table II summarizes Neilson’s excellent overview of the anomalies in MER operations that occurred in the first two years of commanding two rovers on Mars. Note that Livingstone was not used on the MER mission, it is simply a well-known mission whose fault protection system and performance have been thoroughly described in the literature. Table II captures the anomalies that caused the two rovers to enter a fault response during approximately 1550 days worth of operations. The first column is a short name we have given to the anomaly. The second column denotes whether the problem was due to software, hardware or interactions with the environment. We presume that most MBD applications do not apply to dynamic interactions with the environment, though this is incidental to our analysis. The third column describes how many days passed between when the anomaly occurred and the subsystem involved in the anomaly was put back into routine operations. Note in many cases other non-effected subsystems were put back into operation sooner.

The final column describes what response was developed by the MER anomaly analysis team.

This table captures anomalies during non-critical portions of the mission. In this case, we define the ideal value of having on-board diagnosis and recovery to be equivalent to the amount of operational time lost waiting in safe mode after an anomaly. This is the amount of time that would have been saved if every anomaly was resolved immediately. A second term in expected value is the rate of failure within on-board spacecraft systems, which we expect to be quite low in general. This is important because the product of our value term and this rate, conceptually the expected amount of time the spacecraft spends in safe mode, is an upper bound on the value of on-board recovery, representing the ideal case where for every anomaly our MBD system produces a correct diagnosis and a productive recovery. This bound is simply the nature of attempting to provide value with on-board diagnosis and recovery.

Looking at Table II, the small number of hardware and software related anomalies suggests that the rate of anomaly occurrence is quite small. The amount of time spent on anomaly recovery was about 2% of the operational time, including a significant amount of time responding to environmental problems such as being stuck in soft sand. Thus for MER we know the amount of potential operational time spent in safe mode turned out to be 2% of the operational time of the rover. This represents the ideal upper bound of the value of using MBD to immediately recover during routine operations if every anomaly could be correctly resolved autonomously on-board.

The reduction from ideal MBD performance to the expected value is determined by our estimates of the likelihood that a given MBD system will correctly diagnose these anomalies and the likelihood that it can provide a productive recovery. Looking at the failures in Table II the first question to consider is out of the enormous space of component failure modes, what is the likelihood that a priori our models would have covered diagnoses and recoveries for these failures? The second question is what is the likelihood that our automated software would have produced recoveries that were both correct and more valuable than simply shutting down subsystems and waiting for ground analysis as the existing MER system does? Since MER did not use an on-board MBD system, discussing the likelihood of a correct diagnosis or recovery may be considered conjecture. We believe one can
get a sense of the (small) magnitude of these likelihoods from columns three and four of the table. These reflect the amount of time the engineers who built the rover, flight software and operations system spent carefully probing the rovers with small experiments and then deriving a recovery and new operational policy that would accommodate the failure and the rover’s interaction with the environment. We believe that the MER pattern of short, infrequent bursts of extremely careful analysis indicates the effective value of MBD would be significantly less than adding 2% to the rovers’ operational time.

Table II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brief Description</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Days of Analysis</th>
<th>Recovery process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheel drive actuator</td>
<td>HW</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Experiment to characterize capability of wheel. Warm actuator before use. Drive backward dragging wheel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steering current</td>
<td>HW</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Experiment to characterize source of current increase. Use ‘K’ turns to avoid steering failed wheel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoulder actuator current</td>
<td>HW</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Experiment to characterize shoulder motor degradation. Characterization of future arm failure on driving. Change stowage policy to minimize thermal cycling &amp; forestall failure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heater stuck on</td>
<td>HW</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Determine that survival heater was stuck on. * Operations continued while problem was addressed. Implement policy to remove batteries from power bus at night. Rely on solar power to wake rover at dawn. Trade off power savings vs. degradation of instrument due to cold.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late wakeup/dust storm</td>
<td>Env</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Solar panels woke up rover slightly late due to dust storm. Rover missed time to start sequence, waited in standby mode. Plan future sequences to start at least 1 hour after expected wakeup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rock stuck in wheel</td>
<td>Env</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Current spike explained by seeing rock in the wheel in imagery. Several days of careful driving to dislodge rock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuck in sand</td>
<td>Env</td>
<td>40*</td>
<td>Imagery suggests rover is not moving. Wheels 70% buried in sand. * Continue all non-drive activities on Mars during analysis. Set up testbed with similar consistency soil, practice escape strategies. Carefully drive out using escape strategy. Augment driving policy to avoid wheel embedding on future drives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flash file system anomaly</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Overloaded file system table prevents creation of new files. Rover continuously reboots. Understand what on-board FP system is doing, what is causing reboots. Send command to rover to start up without file system, gain control of rover. Determine issue with file system. Clear and rebuild file system. Carefully manage production of files. Return to nominal ops. Later upload patch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Startup race condition</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lose communication window every few hundred sols. Added short keep out period after startup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imaging race condition</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Imaging HW shut down while sequence still reading data from HW. Shut down sequence fixed to halt imager sequence before HW shut down.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrupt command</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>6*</td>
<td>Solar conjunction test of corrupt commands overloads command handler. * Normal commanding resumed after solar conjunction over.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable eval exception</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>Same global defined in two sequences running in parallel, result in fault. * Includes idle weekend. Do not run two scripts that define same global.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upload fault</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Initial uplink through orbiter experiment overloaded CPU. Pad uplink file, limit size.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, we believe the likelihood of failure is low for operational spacecraft, meaning even the potential benefit for MBD is limited. In addition, we consider the likelihood of correct diagnosis and recovery to be low, further lowering the expected value of MBD. MBD-friendly situations where combinatorics and propagation of information are the issue in generating diagnoses and recoveries, as was initially suggested by Cassini’s 27 valve propulsion system and its $2^{27}$ configurations, do not appear to be the driving problem in spacecraft FP and anomaly resolution. For the types of applications we are familiar with, failures that do cause loss of operational time are typically complex, unexpected and break the modeling abstractions used to develop the system.

Consider the failure of the Galileo antenna to deploy or the MER rover rebooting due to flash problems. These types of problems typically require detailed analysis, creativity and validation before returning the spacecraft to an operational state. Thus for the missions we’ve considered in detail (all unmanned, deep space missions) we would assign a low expected value to the use of on-board model-based diagnosis and recovery. We next consider risk and cost.
VIII. NON-TRIVIAL COST INCREASES

During Livingstone development, we projected future missions would enjoy substantial savings by eliminating the need to write a traditional FP system or to perform the system-level analysis done to determine the correct response to critical, mission ending anomalies. Much of the work previously done through system level analysis would be done through inference. Costs would largely consist of the effort needed to encode models for the MBD system, which would be reduced via graphical modeling tools developed with Livingstone.

We now believe that use of MBD adds significant analysis, development and testing costs. In retrospect, use of a MBD system does not eliminate the need of a FP system, and thus does not eliminate that source of analysis costs. Creating the models required for an MBD system also requires significant analysis specific to this usage. Unlike traditional approaches, the value proposition of MBD also promotes performing a significant amount of “speculative” analysis for a range of non-critical failures that do not strictly need to be completely analyzed a priori. Finally, our experience is the envisioned MBD functionality adds a significant integration and testing effort to production of spacecraft flight software. We consider each of these factors in turn below.

We don’t expect use of MBD to reduce the need for analysis related to FP because in retrospect diagnosis and FP are not equivalent. FP is a system engineering process that impacts the design of hardware, software and operational procedures. It must ensure, for example, if any hardware, software, environmental or operational problem is draining the spacecraft’s batteries, the combined hardware, software, operations system and documented operator procedures have the maximum likelihood of stabilizing the situation before the vehicle is lost. This is a much broader problem than that of on-board component-level diagnosis and reconfiguration of the spacecraft. In addition, the ability to compute component-level diagnoses is often neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure spacecraft safety. The FP scheme typically identifies only faults (e.g. battery voltage is low) used to find a pre-planned response that is meant to safe the spacecraft or continue a very specific critical sequence over a large space of problems induced by the hardware, software or environment. For example, the FP design might place all non-essential devices on a separate power bus, which is simply turned off if there is any power-related anomaly. Thus in the flight experiments, it was necessary to employ a FP system which did not need to do detailed diagnosis, while running Livingstone, which did not perform system FP. Since MBD as formulated does not address system FP, we didn’t see any demonstration that use of MBD technology eliminated or significantly reduced analysis costs for developing the basic fault protection capability missions require. In the related work section, we do discuss efforts to use MBD-related technologies in early design and validation of more traditional FP systems.

We imagined future missions might use the ability of model-based diagnosis to propagate behavior of individual components across a system model to generate recovery responses on the fly or before flight, meaning the analysis costs of a mission using MBD would drop. Two issues are where the models come from and what analysis do they eliminate? MBD requires a diagnostic model which is different than the simulation models used in routine spacecraft development. The DS-1 experience was that it’s necessary to know the aspects of each component relevant to failure, the plausible failures to be modeled, how they manifest themselves locally, local actions that can be taken, and so on in order to scope and write a model that can be used for anomaly detection, identification and recovery. Our experience was therefore that additional failure modes and effects analysis was needed to drive diagnostic modeling, rather than a model existing through some other process and then being used to replace traditional analysis.

The need for additional analysis is exacerbated by the proposition that an MBD system provide value by autonomously recovering from non-critical anomalies. Consider that the traditional fault protection strategy reserves the most detailed, a priori analysis only for critical sequences and the process of safing the spacecraft. The majority of possible faults simply trigger the safing system without diagnosis to the component level. Since further analysis is performed post hoc, it’s done only for those failures that actually occur, and without the need to codify the diagnosis into a model. The main value ascribed to MBD was that it would do detailed diagnosis and recovery autonomously. This means the analysis and modeling needed to diagnose and recover failures, and the non-trivial task of encoding those capabilities into software, must be done a priori, before we know which failures will occur. Thus we perform the detailed analysis and modeling needed to automatically recover from many non-critical failures that most likely never occur and do not strictly require an immediate response in the unlikely event they do.

Two overlooked additional costs are integrating the model with the spacecraft and testing. Signals generated by the spacecraft’s internal sensors may need to be conditioned to remove transient disturbances or abstracted to match the diagnostic algorithm. Since we are attempting to use all available sensors to autonomously identify failures before abrupt, system-level effects are seen, the Livingstone experience is this can represent at least as much work as modeling. Thus we believe integration costs are higher than for FP systems that typically focus on anomaly detection without isolation and use a smaller number of system-level measures. Without respect to testing, one of the main characteristics of Livingstone is the ability to generate novel combinations of diagnoses and recoveries from the possible diagnoses and recoveries for individual components. However, it was still necessary to work through the possible failures, how the failure would propagate through the system, and how Livingstone would respond, then validate the expected behavior through testing. Given the space of possible responses Livingstone could generate, the issue of how to validate it at a reasonable cost was an issue during experiments and remains an issue.

As a point of interest, Table I lists approximate development costs for Livingstone applications where it was possible to make an estimate. On the DS-1 experiment, three people worked part time for a total of approximately 36 person-months developing a model of 5 subsystems of the spacecraft.

Approximately 96 person months were spent including the model and all of the integration and sensor signal conditioning necessary to run on-board the spacecraft. For the EO-1 experiment, a total of 2.8 person-months were spent modeling and approximately 12 person months was invested in integration and signal conditioning. It’s important to note that these figures are not the cost of the FP system, as Livingstone alone was unable to provide FP for the spacecraft. These are the costs to develop a diagnosis and recovery system for combinations of failures in specific subsystems.

In summary, we believe the proposed use of MBD represents a cost increase rather than savings. The need to develop a separate set of component-level diagnostic models adds cost, and does not significantly offset FP analysis costs. The desire to have, a priori, a system that can autonomously diagnose and recover a spacecraft even for non-critical anomalies appears to introduce additional detailed analysis, model encoding, signal conditioning and testing that is not necessary if the spacecraft is simply put in a safe mode when possible. We believe the approach is also a cost disadvantage due to the more complex testing and verification requirements necessary to ensure any of the additional diagnoses and novel recoveries such a system might generate during autonomous operations would not endanger the spacecraft.

IX. INCREASED RISK

Initially, we imagined that MBD would reduce risk of mission loss by generating diagnoses and recoveries on the fly and increasing the range of situations over which specialized fault responses were available. Customers were instead concerned that the more complex response of an MBD system would itself cause an anomaly or compound a failure, and this would have an impact in terms of operational complexity during anomalies, lost science, or loss of mission capabilities. Reducing risk to a level acceptable to mission customers quickly emerged as an open issue that is key to future use.

We can divide sources of this perceived risk into three categories: increase in risk due to the fact that the MBD system is capable of a wider range of responses and generates them on the fly, increase in risk from continuing to operate after an anomaly when not strictly necessary, and the operational impact if the actions of an autonomous on-board recovery system must be understood and potentially mitigated when the spacecraft has ceased operating according to design and the ground team must intervene.

Missions considered that MBD would increase risk because of the increased complexity of the software’s response and our inability to concisely characterize, enumerate and validate the range of diagnoses and responses the system might undertake. Rather than engineer a small number of safing responses that are as broadly applicable as possible, MBD seeks to generate recovery responses that are as specialized as possible on the fly. It’s interesting to note that this does not necessarily imply that an MBD system responds to a broader range of anomalies, simply that it responds in a more specialized fashion to each. This means there are far more variations in spacecraft response based on its state, and the full set of conditions and responses could not be enumerated and tested. In addition, the purpose of MBD is to propagate information across the modeled system to allow variations in response. Thus it can be difficult to even concisely describe how small, non-local variations in the space of inputs will impact the response, and difficult to argue that a specific set of test cases provides good coverage for validation. Combating this perceived increase in risk is a challenge since the ability of MBD to respond with a far wider range of behaviors than traditional FP is both its selling point and the source of concern that the system will do something unpredictable. Some work has been done to apply model checking approaches [19] and to generate static representations that are simpler to validate [20], but this remains a significant issue for adoption.

An additional increase in risk comes from the proposal to continue to operate the spacecraft via a recovery generated on-board when it is possible to safe the spacecraft and await expert analysis. Consider the three wheel problems of Table II, Wheel drive actuator, Rock stuck in wheel, and Stuck in sand. One can imagine mis-diagnosing which failure was occurring and applying the recovery meant for another (e.g., attempting to drive in circles when stuck in sand rather than when a rock is in the wheel) could permanently trap or damage the rover. We don’t have examples of Livingstone mis-diagnosing a spacecraft failure as none occurred during the flight experiments, but we do have examples of false positives (indicating a failure when none exists) during the EO-1 experiment. Thus it’s important to keep in mind that MBD may cause us to execute actions that are inappropriate for the true state of the spacecraft. This risk of exacerbating a failure through continued operation rather than safing is one of the items we are asking missions to trade against in order to gain the small expected value estimated in the previous section.

Note the impact is not just potential loss of mission. Having specialized, generated responses to anomalies may make it harder and more costly to determine what exactly the spacecraft believes it is doing should something go wrong and mission controllers need to intervene. This is hard to characterize exactly, as we don’t have good examples of a model-based FP system resolving an anomaly in operations, or of it needing assistance or intervention from the ground. We experienced a little of this in the Remote Agent Experiment, due to actual, non-diagnosed anomalies during the experiment [21]. It may be better to consider how difficult it is to debug anomalies from millions of miles away even with (comparatively) simple safing and recovery actions, as in the FLASH anomaly in the Spirit Mars rover [22]. For the Livingstone flight experiments, risk was acceptable because the MBD system operated on top of a complete, separate fault protection system which protected the spacecraft. On DS-1, for example, the flight software included a FP system that monitored the spacecraft for indications that any occurrence, including commands given by Livingstone, were putting the spacecraft in a risky situation. The FP system would then stop all commanding of the spacecraft and put the spacecraft into a safe mode to await contact from mission controllers. In addition, Livingstone’s communication with the spacecraft...
was through a filter which ensured Livingstone could only send specific commands which had been analyzed for safety. If the underlying fault protection system were activated, that filter would be closed and Livingstone would be terminated.

In an unforgiving environment such as space, Livingstone’s ability to provide novel diagnoses and recoveries to failure combinations we had not explicitly considered was far less important than being able to verify exactly how it was going to respond in the most likely and most critical anomaly situations. Guarding an MBD system with a traditional FP system and restricting the commands it can give is one approach to bringing it to the level of predictability needed to convince mission stakeholders the spacecraft will not go in to an unsafe state. This strategy was appropriate for experiments whose purpose was to show the technology could be flown. In routine operations, it would tend to undermine the cost and value arguments of using MBD. If MBD technology, or to an extent, any autonomous on-board technology, is to make an impact on operations, we believe this open question of predictability, validation and risk must be addressed regardless of what the proposed value is.

X. Discussion

In this paper we have discussed the expectations for model-based diagnosis and recovery systems such as Livingstone and why we believe not all of those expectations were met. We attempted to lay out the basic cost/benefit drivers in a domain of interest (unmanned spacecraft) and our understanding of why model-based diagnosis and recovery has found relatively little traction. We can grossly characterize the common practice in FP to be identifying those contingencies where an active, specific response to anomalies must be made (e.g., loss of a motor during an orbital insertion) and providing identification and response to those states. In other anomalous conditions, the spacecraft is safed and engineers diagnose the problem post hoc. For the missions we’ve considered, this approach seems to provide lower risk and more than adequate value in terms of anomaly response when compared to MBD. In addition we have not yet developed or seen an argument or demonstration that the total analysis, development and testing cost for an MBD-based system would be lower than those based on the common practice.

During non-critical mission phases, the net value of having on-board diagnosis and recovery is low since we are free to simply put the spacecraft into a safe mode and only then invest resources attempting to find a diagnosis or response. During critical phases (as well as non-critical) the real need to circumscribe and validate the responses of the FP system decreases the proposed value of MBD’s ability to generate novel responses, while increasing its testing and analysis costs in an attempt to contain risk. We also believe the key questions of how on-board, component-level diagnosis fits in with and adds value to the broader task of fault protection engineering, and how MBD technologies would reduce fault protection costs remain open. Thus we believe it is difficult to justify the use of on-board, generative diagnosis and recovery systems like those we have been involved with based on cost, risk or value, at least for the type of missions with which we are familiar.

We can also summarize our analysis of MBD for spacecraft by noting that model-based diagnosis and recovery is a “deep” strategy. For a given failure, we incur cost to automatically generate the most specific diagnosis and most complete recovery we can, relying heavily upon our diagnostic model, current sensor readings, and our inference algorithms. The design of a FP system, generally speaking, takes a “broad” strategy. We find a response involving the spacecraft hardware, software and operations team that covers the maximum number of contingencies regardless of underlying cause, making the minimal number of assumptions about what systems on the spacecraft are operating as designed and restoring the minimal functionality needed for spacecraft survival. We can easily construct specific scenarios where, assuming the model holds, the response of an on-board MBD system is more powerful and even avoids loss of the spacecraft. However, in real operations where the likelihood of any particular failure is low, the space of possible failures is enormous and the correctness of a model once failures occur is suspect, the broad approach is superior.

It’s often proposed that very ambitious missions, such as a penetrator to melt through Europa’s icy shell, will require advanced on-board autonomy in the style of MBD. This implies the mission design is such that the credible risks of losing the spacecraft would be complex or numerous enough that they could not be reasonably characterized and a policy developed a priori, so that on-board inference of specialized responses would be necessary. For such a mission to be deemed feasible and worth a risk in the billions of dollars, and not simply deferred or re-designed, MBD would need to be seen as buying down an enormous amount of risk, rather than introducing it. This would require dealing with the issues of verification, characterizing coverage and behavior, and reasoning from a model that becomes incomplete during failures.

The ideal application for MBD technology would be a system where concise, component-level models of nominal operation and failure modes are fairly easy to encode to reduce cost, and are not likely to be grossly violated during failure (e.g. components not linked in the design do not influence each other under failure conditions), so the likelihood of reacting properly during failure is high. Though made of easy to model components, the system would need to have enough combinatorial complexity to allow MBD diagnosis algorithms to provide leverage. Two such areas might be modular robotics [23], where the functionality of a machine is achieved by re-configuring tens or hundreds or thousands of identical very simple machines, or autonomic computing [24], the task of autonomously managing networks of communication and computation equipment, where there is a very strong abstraction between the functionality of a component of the network and the underlying hardware.

This is not to say there aren’t ways to make MBD more attractive to spacecraft missions. One theme is to use MBD to assist people with ground-based diagnosis and recovery. As with the Eureka system described in Related Work, one
challenge is how a MBD system would assist domain experts in the kind of unanticipated anomalies that they find challenging. One potential answer is to move from a focus on automated diagnosis to mixed initiative (human-in-the-loop) use of diagnosis technology in both the development of broad FP systems and in the process of diagnosis during an anomaly. By analogy, in mixed initiative planning [25] rather than an autonomous on-board system generating and executing a plan, planning software assists a human expert in developing a plan for later execution. The human expert remains the final authority on what is included in the plan and its validity. This approach has a raft of advantages for spacecraft operations [26]. Intuitively, it allows the planning software and model to perform the 80% of the planning task it is capable of performing correctly. At the same time, cleaning up the planner’s suggestions is far easier for the human expert than creating a plan without the planner’s suggestions, analysis and explanations. It frees us from what is potentially the fool’s errand of attempting to develop models that are complete and correct under any circumstances. Finally, it involves the user in the process of developing a plan, so he or she is confident in what the plan does and why. By analogy, a mixed-initiative MBD system might assist a human expert in developing a broad FP system that can be concisely described, validated, or further modified by hand to reflect factors not captured by the MBD system or its model. Existing commercial systems for analyzing diagnosability and sensor placement are instances of this approach. Further moves in this direction include using MBD to compile FP rules that can be verified and modified [20] or to verify the fault response design of a traditional FP system [27]. We believe this style of leveraging MBD technology represents an opportunity for the community to gain greater impact on spacecraft operations and other endeavors.

For potential customers of MBD or other similar technologies, we hope this paper might inspire ways of thinking about the effective value to a project or mission. For advocates, we hope this paper might gather common criticisms of model based diagnosis technology into specific categories which can be addressed through research and development or rebutted through counter-examples or demonstration.

XI. RELATED WORK

In this section we discuss techniques for analyzing the benefits of a technology similar to the one presented for MBD. We then present a small set of systems that are model-based, or pertain to diagnosis and recovery, or have been fielded in operational use, our ultimate interest being finding a system that is all three. Finally, we discuss some systems that are using MBD-related technologies in a more mixed-initiative format for development of fault-protection systems. A number of analytic approaches exist for examining the cost/benefit tradeoffs of technology investments. The cost/benefit analysis presented in this paper is an instance of a more general technology investment analysis described by Lincoln et al. [31]. This methodology has been applied to other spacecraft autonomy technologies, but not MBD in particular. Chase et al. propose a utility-based method based on science return for evaluating inclusion of new technologies into Mars rover missions [32]. Similar analyses have been applied to Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) technologies [28], [29], [30]. IVHM is broader and somewhat orthogonal to model-based diagnosis and recovery as we have framed it, in that IVHM is typically concerned with all aspects of supporting operations of one or a fleet of systems. The focus of IVHM is typically on increasing operational availability and reducing maintenance and support costs, with somewhat less emphasis on on-line diagnosis of an operational system to allow it to continue a specific sortie or mission. Williams for example describes a discrete event simulation that can compute different quantitative measures of effectiveness such as missions completed or number of vehicles in maintenance in a given period [28]. The tool is aimed at analyzing the sensitivity of various operational concepts to given assumptions about the performance of various IVHM capabilities. Our paper suggests a very similar, less mature but potentially more specialized method for evaluating MBD specifically. It also focuses on how assumptions about performance and the customer’s operational model (the input to Williams’ analysis methods) led to overestimating the impact of model-based diagnosis and recovery, and what factors in hindsight might have allowed a more accurate cost/benefit analysis.

We next discuss operational diagnosis systems, a few model-based systems, and finally MBD systems. There are many commercially successful diagnosis applications. For example, every car sold in the United States since 1996 is required to comply with the On-Board Diagnostics II (OBDII) standard, which specifies a set of on-board tests and makes diagnostic information available to off-board diagnostic systems. Some vehicles are even able to perform some amount of active testing, and have a “limp home” mode when sensors or engine control actuators are suspect [33]. However, what we are specifically interested in is systems that generate diagnoses on-line, based on some generic engine or set of principles plus a domain description of some sort, rather than systems where engineering analysis is encoded into static code or a table representing a recovery policy. It is interesting to note that when millions of the same unit will be manufactured (for example, a vehicle controller) one can amortize the cost of developing a high performance control system through engineering analysis, somewhat undermining the cost reduction motivation of MBD.

The very successful Cassini mission, whose main propulsion system was later used as a benchmark problem in development of Livingstone, made use of a very capable rule-based fault diagnosis and recovery system in operations [34], [2]. That is, a FMECA process was used to derive the set of critical failures, the symptoms or monitored sensor values that would result, and the appropriate responses. These mappings from monitored values to diagnosed states were encoded in rules. The appropriate commands to respond to each state were similarly encoded. For situations that could not be mapped directly from the sensor states to a diagnosis, the spacecraft would temporarily be set to a simple, safe state then the spacecraft would execute a sequence of commands designed
to reveal the problem or move the spacecraft from the safe state to an operational state.

There have been quite a few operational uses of what may be loosely called model-based autonomy technologies outside the arena of MBD. For example, the EO1 spacecraft [18], 2003 Mars Exploration Rovers [35], 2007 Phoenix Mars Lander [26] and upcoming Mars Science Laboratory rover [26] all used or are preparing to use model-based planning and scheduling software in routine operations. Thousands of daily operational plans have been generated for the Mars Exploration Rovers, and Casper planner was the basis of a low cost mission extension for the EO-1 spacecraft. We believe some of the differences in impact between the conceptually similar technologies of model-based planning and MBD can be put into the context of our analysis. First, the likelihood of the system being called into use is essentially 1.0 in the planning case, as the planner is typically in daily use to generate plans for routine operations. Contrast this with the diagnosis system, where the likelihood of providing utility is the product of the likelihood of each failure, the likelihood that the failure was a priori covered by the diagnostic model, and the likelihood there is an effective recovery. Second, based on our experience with diagnosis and planning the cost of modeling is lower for planning. The planner model concerns only nominal operation of the spacecraft, which is typically well understood, often well documented, and in some cases can be translated into a model from existing mission artifacts [26]. Compare this with model-based diagnosis, where the modeling task is to write a set of models that capture, again a priori, a set of relevant failures and how the failure signals are propagated across the system once it stops behaving according to its nominal model.

Researchers at Xerox PARC developed a model-based system for planning and scheduling print jobs within reconfigurable high Xerox end printers [36] that has been used in Xerox products since 1995. Engineers developing new variations of the machines write constraints between the sheets of paper and components in the printing process, and do not explicitly write a schedule or scheduling software for the machine. For each print job, a model-driven scheduler within the printer develops a schedule that is optimal for the job characteristics and the constraints imposed by the components available in the machine. This represents a commercially successful deployment of model-based reasoning, but does not appear to include any diagnosis, recovery or handling of anomalies during operation of the machine.

We now come to MBD systems. Researchers at Xerox PARC developed a MBD system for copiers [37] intended to assist field technicians. After being presented to technicians, the system was not deployed and a community knowledge sharing system was deployed instead [38]. To paraphrase, the model-based diagnoser was not deployed because technicians knew how to identify and correct common faults, and small optimizations in that process were not of high value. The real issue was unexpected issues that were not foreseen during the design of the machine or development of the diagnostic models. These might arise from operating the machine in extreme environments, unintentional interactions of components in a newly released design, unanticipated failure modes as the machines age, and so on. Thus, after a study of the technicians' work process Eureka did not attempt to augment or replace the expert technicians' ability to perform diagnostic reasoning. Eureka instead allows technicians to exchange tips on new faults, diagnoses and responses as they are created in the field, the success of which can be judged by its 20,000 users.

TEAMS [39] is a commercial design and diagnosis product that has been applied to a number of aerospace systems. TEAMS Designer allows the user to specify flow of material or signals between subsystems of a physical system, specify sensor placement, and write tests on sensor values. TEAMS uses this information to perform off-line testability analysis to determine which component failures can be detected and further isolated, and make recommendations to improve testability. This capability has been used for analysis of large aerospace systems, and researchers are investigating its use in determining the adequacy of FP responses very early in the design of spacecraft systems [27]. TEAMS-RT compiles the TEAMS model into a matrix which is used to determine which subsystems may be faulty from the outcome of sensor tests, and which can be examined and validated before use. Researchers developed a TEAMS-RT prototype to demonstrate near real-time diagnosis of systems on-board a UH-60 Helicopter [40]. A prototype to assist engineers in making pre-launch diagnosis decisions for NASA's Ares 1-X launch vehicle is currently in development, as is a system for in-flight diagnosis of the NASA's Orion capsule [41]. These applications have the strong advantage that the diagnosis system is compiled into a matrix which can be validated, and the diagnostic output is interpreted and vetted by an engineer before action is taken. Similar work has been done to convert a MBD model to a set of rules that can be validated [20]. Challenges always arise when attempting to move from a prototype to a production system with demands on risk, cost and benefits. We believe the best opportunity lies in these kinds of applications where MBD technology assists in developing a broad FP system that can be validated before execution and where appropriate, the output is vetted by an expert before being acted upon.

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